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021203Z Aug 05

ACTION AF-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	INL-00	DODE-00	PERC-00
	DS-00	EAP-00	EUR-00	FBIE-00	VC-00	H-00	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	CAC-00	VCE-00	M-00	NEA-00
	NRC-00	NSAE-00	OES-00	OIC-00	NIMA-00	PA-00	GIWI-00
	FMPC-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	SS-00	EPAE-00	SCRS-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-00	DRL-00	G-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/001W	

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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2087  
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE  
DARFUR COLLECTIVE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
USLO TRIPOLI  
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 001209

SIPDIS

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PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS  
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2014  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PREF](#) [CD](#) [SU](#)  
SUBJECT: DISCUSSING DARFUR WITH DEBY

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (C) Summary: President Idriss Deby outlined Chad's perspective on the upcoming round of negotiations on Darfur in a meeting on July 29 with Ambassador John Yates, the U.S. Special Representative to the talks. Deby expressed his concerns with the African Union's lack of consultation and acceptance of the views of Chad, as the co-mediator, and the proposals of other partners. He also shared his doubts about how representative the movements' leadership was and emphasized the importance of resolving divisions within the movements prior to the next round of talks. Finally, Deby stated the need to expand the mandate of the AU forces to protect civilians. The meeting appeared to settle some of Chad's angst over challenges to its role as co-mediator in the peace process. The Chad mediation team is traveling to Addis Ababa on August 3 for meetings with the AU. Nonetheless, we urge a consultative visit to Chad by Dr. Salim Salim similar to those undertaken by his predecessor prior to the next round of talks. End Summary.

12. (C) On July 29, Ambassador Wall, Special Representative for the Darfur Peace Talks Ambassador John Yates, and P/E Officer met with President Idriss Deby to solicit Chad's views on the Darfur peace process. Chad's mediation team, General Mahamat Ali Abdullah and Allam-mi Ahmad, and Cabinet Director Mahamat Ali Annadif and Presidential Secretary Brahim Deby participated in the meeting.

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THE TROUBLE WITH THE AFRICAN UNION...  
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13. (C) President Idriss Deby, well in command of the details of the Darfur situation, stated that Chad will continue its co-mediation role in the peace process and views the coming discussions of political questions essential to the resolution of the crisis. Deby noted the continued negative evolution of the situation with the African Union. He said that Chad's involvement in the resolution of the conflict pre-dated the AU's and outlined the process through which Chad became a co-mediator with the AU. Chad has the advantage of knowing the key players and the terrain better than the staff at the AU. However, the AU continues to ignore Chad's written strategy proposals and does not listen to advice, particularly about personalities and events on the ground, according to Deby. He counseled that the AU must be willing to take into account the views and proposals of other partners.

14. (C) Deby gave as an example a five-point plan for the resolution of the Darfur situation put forward by Sudanese President Bashir in Tripoli. The plan called for autonomy for Darfur, an wealth-sharing formula, participation by the rebels in the government and in the management of the country, reconstruction and development in Darfur, and the

return of refugees to Sudan in five years. Deby stated that the plan was presented in front of five heads of state, including those of Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and Chad. (Note: He could not remember the fifth. End Note.) Chad's frustration with the AU's inability to make concrete decisions stems from the "incalculable consequences" that the presence of the Sudanese refugees is taking on the country's economy, environment, and stability, according to Deby. He noted that the conflict in Darfur threatens to drag the whole region into a war like the one in Africa's Great Lakes region.

15. (C) In an effort to prepare for the next round of discussions, Chad's mediation team, Allam-mi and Ali, will head to Addis Ababa on August 3 to consult with the AU. It is not clear if Salim Salim will be there, according to Allam-mi.

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DIVISIONS WITHIN AND BETWEEN THE MOVEMENTS  
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16. (C) Deby discussed the divisions within the rebel movements. He expressed his conviction that the rebel leaders at the negotiating table do not represent their movements on the ground. He questioned what Dr. Khalil

Ibrahim, Abdelwahid Nur, and Mini Minawi have done in the field over the past two years and whom each of the three actually represents now. Deby pointed out that they stand in contrast to Dr. John Garang. Deby said "hotel rebels" do not represent those on the ground, especially if they are afraid to go to the field or enter into dialogue with the field commanders.

17. (C) In addition, Deby asked how the peace process will move forward when the two rebel movements have different political objectives. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) seeks power at the national level and would like to see Bashir leave office. The Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) is calling for the development of Darfur, participation in governance, and the coexistence of different communities. Deby questioned whether this would mean negotiating with each movement separately, i.e., one set of negotiations between the GOS and SLM and one set between the GOS and JEM.

18. (C) Deby's last point concerned the role of Libya. He acknowledged that as an AU member and a neighboring country, Libya has a role in the talks. However, he expressed concern about the members and leaders of the rebel movements traveling to Tripoli without any of the international partners present.

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MODALITIES OF UPCOMING TALKS  
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19. (C) Ambassador Yates told Deby that the United States recognizes and appreciates Chad's key role in the peace process and its position as a co-mediator. He reiterated Secretary Rice's hope that a political agreement could be

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finished by the end of the year. He noted the U.S. concern that the establishment of the Government of National Unity in Sudan not be upset by the absence of an agreement on Darfur. Yates said that the Secretary's and the Deputy Secretary's visits to Darfur underscore the priority the United States places on obtaining peace in Darfur. Yates agreed that the SLM has too many divisions. He told Deby that the United States has contacts with the various rebel leaders and also is urging the resolution to SLM's leadership issues. Ambassador Yates outlined the AU's current ideas on ways in which to accelerate the next round of talks. For example, the AU is thinking about running concurrent negotiating committees on power sharing, wealth sharing, and security arrangements. In addition, the AU wants to limit the size of the official delegations to a maximum of 25.

110. (C) Deby responded, noting that ten to fifteen delegates per movement should be enough. Deby advised that a leader of each delegation must be designated to make decisions on behalf of the group. Deby complained that the various rebel leaders, Abdelwahid, Mini, and Khalil attend openings and then leave. More importantly, the negotiators at the table must represent and be accepted by those in Darfur, and various ethnic groups must be adequately represented by the movements. Deby questioned whether Dr. Khalil Ibrahim represents anyone in the field. He also stated that the United States, the EU, France, and other partners need to place the same pressure on the parties and that the AU, Nigeria, and Chad act consistently to provide coherence to the process in the future.

111. (C) Ambassador Yates agreed, explaining that this was the underlying purpose of his trip to Addis Ababa, Khartoum, and N'Djamena. Deby appreciated Yates's point that he had

chosen these capitals, not Tripoli or Asmara, for this round on consultations. Yates cautioned, however, that he is realistic about the pace of progress in the next round, given that it took 30 days to negotiate three pages of text. Yates noted that much work needs to be done before the next round, the members of the movements must be prepared, and the AU needs to prepare as much as possible in advance. Deby agreed, expressing again his concern with the movements' internal problems. Yates also expressed appreciation for Chad's assistance in the Rwandan airlift. Deby stated that it is critical to augment the AU forces on the ground. Deby added that the AU protection force needs an expanded mandate to include protection of civilians. He noted that right now, the AU monitors are very expensive, given the number of

protection force members designated to protect the current number of monitors and the cost of the deployment.

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COMMENT  
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12. (C) Deby demonstrated a detailed understanding of obstacles facing the Abuja peace process. He appeared pleased that Ambassador Yates included Chad in consultations on the upcoming round of negotiations. The travel of the Chad mediators to Addis Ababa is a positive step toward ironing out some of the problems that occurred in Abuja. We note, however, that given the lack of an AU presence in Chad, a visit by Dr. Salim Salim to N'Djamena for consultations is important. His predecessor made several visits to Chad to coordinate mediation efforts and take stock of the situation on the ground. Deby's criticisms of Dr. Khalil Ibrahim and JEM are not new and the representation of both movements at the negotiating table is an issue that will continue to plague the talks. This is an issue that the AU needs to tackle directly.

13. (U) Ambassador Yates did not have an opportunity to clear this cable prior to departure.

14. (U) Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered.  
WALL

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